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SUZANNE LAST STONE
This symposium asks us to consider whether halakhic values and principles require Orthodox Judaism to take on the role of a public, as
opposed to a private, religion in American society. A public religion
assumes a role in the political or civil life of the polity by engaging in
political activities, in political society, or by participating in open
debates about the common good in the undifferentiated sphere of civil
society. 1 Until quite recently, a silent consensus existed between religions and constitutional theorists about the "wall of separation" and
about "dialogic neutrality," the banishing of religious language from
public discourse in order to promote equal access to the public square.
Both agreed that religion "should remain private and implicit, rather
than public and explicit. " 2 Religious individuals could enter public life,
but they did so as indistinguishable citizens. Today, the wall of separation is far more porous, and even constitutional theorists have come to
see restrictions on the use of religious language in the public square as
unfairly forcing citizens to abandon their religious identities in public.
This has paved the way for a new form of public religion in American
society, in which religions enter the public sphere as a corporate body,
not as discrete individuals, and state their views in explicitly religious
language. Should Orthodox Judaism assume this public role?
Of course, in the eyes of American society, Judaism, along with
Catholicism and Protestantism, has already taken its place among the
major public religions in America. Judaism's inclusion in this trio,
despite its 111inuscule size by comparison with the other two, is a tribute
to the massive efforts of Jewish organizational life. But the general perception within American society that Judaism is already one of the three
major "public religions" in the United States also steins from a subtler
but no less critical factor. In the view of American society, a public religion is not only one that participates in the political sphere to further its
own particular interests through coalitions and lobbying. A public religion contributes to the general welfare of the polity as a whole by freely
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sharing its perspectives on public issues, public affairs, and the good of
the commonwealth. It does so in order to create a better society, a society that will flourish and thrive if the perspective of the particular religion is brought to bear on the important issues of the day. American
society assumes that Judaism, as the source of all three biblical religions,
continues to be a repository of wisdom and a valuable moral and intellectual resource for civilization. It assumes that Judaism wishes to bring,
and, indeed, already has brought, its sources of wisdom into the public
square of ideas.
How did this perception come abouti To a large extent, this perception follows from the early penetration of Reform Judaism into the
public square. Reform Judaism not only redefined the mission of
Judaism as social action; it also presented its social agenda, its "prophetic" mission, as the embodiment and sum content of Jewish teachings.
Most Americans, including many non-Orthodox Jews, have an extremely
vague sense of the sources of wisdom Judaism actually contains. Few
are actually aware of the existence of the halakhic tradition, and even
those who are aware of its existence lack a sense of its depth and scope.
Even Jews who are aware of the immensity of learning within halakha
rarely imagine that this tradition may speak to issues of the day. The
myth of a shared Judea-Christian tradition that pervades American culture stems from viewing Judaism as a biblical religion, primarily defined
by Scripture, rather than by the talmudic tradition.
Public ignorance of the halakhic tradition persists to this day
because American Orthodox Judaism, the only branch with serious
knowledge of and deep commitment to the halakhic tradition, has not
yet found its full public voice. Although the Orthodox community has
very successfully entered political life, mobilizing institutional resources
to help Orthodox Judaism thrive in America, it has neither entered into
public intellectual and social debate in a serious and ongoing way, nor
has it clarified internally whether halakhic perspectives should in fact be
communicated to society at large. This absence of an audible public
voice on the critical issues of the day deprives not only "others"-that
is, our non-Jewish fellow citizens-of a halakhic perspective; it also
deprives non-Orthodox Jews of access to the teachings of Judaism.
In what follows, I argue that a major obstacle to advancing Orthodox participation in the public square is the tendency to cast the issue
almost exclusively in terms of political participation, rather than in
terms of a more open-ended and collaborative process of intellectual
and civil engagement. Yet Orthodox thought, in my view, compels par-
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ticipation in the public square of ideas far more than it compels participation in the public square of politics.
I

Nearly ten years ago, the Orthodox Forum sponsored a conference on
Social Responsibility in Jewish Thought and Law. 3 In the introduction
to the published proceedings, the editors of the volume stated the case
for Orthodox Jewish participation in the public square. This topic, they
wrote, "has special resonance for Jews who believe that integrating
Judaism with general culture constitutes an ideal." The editors introduced their case with a lengthy citation from a statement delivered by
Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook at the dedication of the Hebrew University
in 1925. R. Kook noted that "[t]wo tendencies characterize Jewish
spirituality." The first is internally directed, and its highest concrete
expression is in Torah institutions such as yeshivot. But, in addition to
deepening the sacredness of Torah, R. Kook also referred to the dialectical process of hotsa)a and hakhnasa-the propagation and absorption
of ideas. Jewish ideas and values should be propagated "from the private domain of Judaism into the public arena of the universe at large."
At the same time, Jews "absorb the general lu1owledge derived by the
collective effort of all humanity, by adapting the good and useful
aspects of general knowledge" to the private domain of Judaism.
Ultimately, they return a synthesis of general lmowledge and Torah values to the world at large. 4
The editors noted that Orthodox efforts at integration have so far
primarily consisted of hakhnasa, the absorption of ideas from general
culture into Orthodox Judaism. Less attention has been paid to hotsa)a,
the flow of ideas in the opposite direction, from Judaism to the outside
world. It seemed obvious, however, that Orthodox thought, reflected
in the writings of R. Samson Raphael Hirsch and R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, as well as R. Kook, obligated Jews to convey Jewish ideas and
values to the universe at large. Accordingly, they expected the conference to end with a call to the modern Orthodox community to engage
in such social action. Instead, the papers delivered at the conference
questioned whether such an obligation actually existed and raised a variety of problems that social action would engender.
Many of the papers produced for the conference focused on the
problems posed by communal participation in the political sphere, as do
most of the questions addressed to the participants in this symposium.
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Indeed, much of the internal discussion within Orthodoxy about
whether Orthodox Jews should bring halakhic viewpoints into the political sphere centers on the following sorts of questions: should Orthodox
positions be reflected in legislation, through the drafting of bills, or
through lobbying activities on pending legislation? Should Orthodox
Jews engage in other forms of advocacy, such as the preparation of policy
statements to governmental bodies? Should Orthodox Jews support or
oppose political candidates based on the views he or she espouses;
should Orthodoxy enter into alliances with other religious groups that
share a policy position with us? This virtually exclusive focus on political
participation is understandable. It stems in part from the increased professionalization of Orthodox Jewish life, its communal, organizational
structure, and the fact that American Orthodox Jews are increasingly in
positions of power, making public policy decisions for the nation, Jew
and non-Jew alike.
Yet Orthodox thought as reflected in R. Kook's remarks does not
address policy advocacy, policy planning, or legislation; it addresses the
communication of Jewish teachings, ideas, and values. Moreover, political forms of participation raise a set of very difficult problems for
Orthodox Judaism as a community that, in many respects, are unique
to Orthodox Judaism. They have no clear counterparts in other religions that have assumed a public role in American society.
A major obstacle to political participation, as Rabbi J. David Bleich
delineated in the conference proceedings, arises from the dual systems
of obligation, one for Jews and the other for non-Jews, contained within halakha. 5 As is well known, the halakha contains two models of social
and moral order. Torah law is particular, covenantal, and aspirational.
Noahide law is universally obligatory and contains those obligations
necessary to create a civilized and morally and politically well-ordered
society. The presence of these two disparate systems of obligation raises
several difficult questions for Orthodox participation in the political
square. First, there is halakhic controversy over whether there is an obligation to disclose Noahide law to non-Jews. Second, Noahide law is also
not well developed as of yet. Third, there is controversy over which
system of obligation, Torah law or Noahide law, ought to govern in
the American public sphere, which is comprised mostly of non-Jews.
One can hardly advocate one public policy for Jews and another for
non-Jews. Advocating the adoption ofTorah law as a standard for public policy in a primarily non -Jewish society would impose a higher o bligation on society than Jewish law itself deems necessary or even wise.

22

Symposium: Suzanne Last Stone
As the Ran observed, Torah law alone does not necessarily aim at or
provide for a realistic, well-ordered political society. It aims to create
an ideal society and its concerns are spiritual perfection. 6 Yet if Jews
advocate, instead, the adoption of policies based on Noahide law,
which reflects the halakhic standard of behavior for non -Jewish society,
Jewish values may be adversely affected. Policies that are appropriate
for non-Jews may be inappropriate for Jews. Policy planning requires
the reconciliation of conflicts between the two systems, which may not
always be possible.
Second, when formulating policy or legislation, one must offer a sin gle and clear statement of the Jewish viewpoint on a complex public
issue. Given the range of halakhic sources and the diversity of legitimate
halakhic opinions, this is an exceedingly difficult end to achieve. Halaldiic
positions are rarely simple, clear, and univocal. Achieving consensus
within the halakhic community on a complex public issue is rare. Moreover, the presentation of a halakhic perspective in the form of an
"answer" necessarily raises the important question of the role of halakhic
expertise and of pesak in the process of formulating such an answer.

II

The focus on policy implementation, legislation, and policy advocacy is
both premature and unduly narrow and restrictive. We first need to
enter the public square of ideas. Rather than react to a specific request
for the halakhic viewpoint about an issue already debated, formulated,
and extensively analyzed in the general p~blic sphere of society, the
Orthodox Jewish community should participate from the beginning,
directly and robustly, in current social and intellectual debates within
civil society. In accordance with R. Kook's model, we should absorb
ideas from general society, consider how they challenge or modify our
own assumptions, and then ascertain and communicate the perspectives
of Torah law.
The process of hakhnasa and hotsa)a, as Rav Kook describes it,
does not require the formulation of policy; rather, it requires the propagation of ideas and values. Moreover, the process of hakhnasa and
hotsa)a does not require making choices between Noahide and Torah
law; it assumes that both will be conveyed as part of the larger whole
of Torah. The process of hakhnasa and hotsa)a does require, however,
deeper engagement with Jewish and general sources, discussion,
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debate, and study-among ourselves and with others outside the
halakhic community who are engaged in the public intellectual and
social arena. It requires moving internal debates from the cloistered
environments of the synagogue, the yeshiva, and the university and
into the larger setting of the public square of ideas. The goal is to add
a critical, moral voice, based on the unique and aspirational perspective
of Torah law, as well as to absorb the critical perspectives offered by
political and ethical 1nodels in general society. General ethical and
political concepts are not antithetical to halakha; they are part of
halakha, properly conceived.
While this form of participation in civil society, in the public square
of ideas, does not require us to formulate specific or single answers to
contemporary controversial issues, it still raises the question about how
the halakhic sources of our tradition are used. The model I advocate is
one that takes the variety of normative Jewish views on how Jewish
society itself ought to be governed and presents them as possible alternative models for general society, pointing out areas of similarity and
difference with existing models in general society and explaining their
respective underlying premises. Disparate views on capital punishment
and collective punishment, for example, appear throughout the Talmud
and medieval sources. Taken together, these disparate views have a discernable and stable set of concerns, many resting on premises that are
thought provoking and relevant for general society to consider.
To be sure, excellent articles and papers have been published, and
talks delivered, that do precisely this, many through the efforts of the
Orthodox Forum. Still, they have not been done within an ongoing,
organized, collaborative, institutional framework-which would increase
the level of conversation and thought. Nor, for the most part, have they
been done in a context that collaboratively engages the larger public
sphere of general society. The public sphere today actively welcomes
such engagement. The general culture in which we now live is far more
interested in religion and its role in society than a mere forty years ago,
and intellectual borders have expanded dramatically to encompass many
traditions beyond the classical Western.
III

Today, with the rise of religious civilizational identities, the pressing
global political issue is the co-existence of religion with democracy.
Can a religious state be democratic and, if so, what forms of democra-
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cy are possible for religious traditions? These are neither theoretical
issues nor issues of exclusively non-Jewish concern. Within the last
decades, a Jewish state has emerged that is, for better or for worse, at
the center of world politics and that is beset by internal divisions exacerbated by the absence of an adequate "Jewish" theory of democracy,
civil society, and tolerance. Halakha itself must grapple with the contemporary challenges of democracy and pluralism. These questions are
as relevant for American Jews as for Israelis. First, American Orthodox
Jews, who have experienced life in a robust, pluralistic democracy over
a long period of time, have a unique perspective to offer on this issue.
Second, American Orthodox Jews themselves interact with others in
the workplace, on campus, and in ordinary social life, exchanging views
on the issues of the day. They, too, require a better sense of how
halakha views the friendship of citizens and what norms of mutuality
are appropriate in a mixed society.
Finally, we are seeing the transfonnation of the American public
square itself "into a world domestic policy arena," in which public
issues become normative issues for all of humanity. The broader society in which American Orthodox Jews live is no longer confined to the
American nation. With globalization, the bonds of solidarity have
expanded to include all humanity, putting the question of human
rights and obligations, world peace, and the fair distribution of world
resources, at the fore of political life. With terrorism, the justness of
preemptive wars and of collective punishment are matters of daily
conversation. With the expansion of scientific-technological frontiers,
giving humanity powers of self-creation and self-destruction, public
policy now penetrates all spheres of life, including the most private.
These momentous ethical issues demand religious reflection; they do
not just affect the world out there, they affect us. They, too, are
Jewish as well as general issues.

IV
Why the relative silence of American Orthodoxy in the pervasive
debates within civil society about these issues? Are there reasons for this
silence that would still counsel hesitation or is the silence a result of the
peculiarities of the Orthodox Jewish condition that must be acknowledged and overcome?
One explanation is rooted in the sociology of the American Ortho-
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dox community over the last decades. Participation at this level requires
serious engagement with the world beyond our own borders and serious intellectual thought, the kind that modern orthodoxy alone aspires
to do. Beginning in the mid-fifties, a strong interest in the application
of the halakha to contemporary issues of public concern emerged. This
was one of Yavneh's (the Orthodox college student association) chief
missions. In 1955, it has been reported, R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik publicly pointed to the lack of serious reflection about halakhic perspectives
on contemporary, controversial issues and cited the Harvard Divinity
School's Institute of Social Ethics as a model,7 a theme he pursued indirectly in his 1964 essay in this journal, "Confrontation." 8 But modern
Orthodox energy these days seems redirected almost exclusively inward
either to the pursuit of intensified Torah study, one of the two poles of
Jewish spirituality that Rav Kook describes, or to internal controversial
issues, such as women's role in Judaism.
Another reason lies in historical circumstances. Due to centuries of
exile, and the late emancipation of Jews into political and civil society,
which was punctuated by the Holocaust and the mobilizing of Jewish
energy to reconstruct Jewish life, halakhic authorities had little reason
to address issues of world concern rather than issues of exclusively
Jewish concern. For most of the last two thousand years, the pressing
challenge facing Jews was to protect the halakhic way of life for a
minority within host states. The Rav, in "Confrontation," clarifies that
"the limited role" Jews played in the "universal confrontation" of man
with the world was a result of historical circumstance, not ideology,
and, therefore, subject to change as historical circumstances change. 9
Yet, the historical developments of the last fifty years, the creation of a
Jewish state, and the emergence of Orthodox Jews in America as full
partners in a society no longer perceived as a host but, rather, as our
own, have far preceded halakhic development of the sources that speak
to the realities of this new age-an age of democracy, fellowship among
citizens, war, and human rights. This state of affairs should be viewed as
a challenge, rather than a barrier, to the dissemination of Jewish ideas
on contemporary issues. The project of developing the relevant halakhic
sources falls to this and succeeding generations.
Finally, one must confront the question whether Jews, indeed, have
a halakhic obligation to convey Torah values and Jewish teachings to
society at large. While modern Orthodox thought strongly points to
the dissemination of halal<llic values and ideas as both a spiritual ideal
and a logical corollary of the halakha's own approach to religion as
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inseparable from society and the public domain, the precise source of
such an obligation is still unclear. Is this obligation rooted in halakha,
hashkafa, or moral principles?
A strong argument can be made that Judaism's mission to the
world is most authentically implemented by teaching through example.10 With the creation of the state of Israel, teaching through example
takes on a genuinely public dimension. In Israel, Jewish issues are nearly
all public issues as well. There, Jews carry the burden of representing
Judaism publicly before the world and serving as a model. This is the
thrust of R. Kook's vision that the life lived by the Jewish people on its
land will be a teaching for all humanity. 11 But Israel then becomes the
exclusive center of the public dimension of Jewish life, while American
Orthodoxy remains a private religion.
This split between the two communities with respect to the role of
halakha in society is deeply unhealthy. It reduces American Orthodoxy
to bystanders, rather than participants, in the development ofhalalcha in
society. Moreover, it deprives the Orthodox community in Israel of a
halalchic perspective on contemporary issues in the public and global
domain that is informed by a different social setting. American Orthodoxy, for example, has a long experience with democracy and with life
within a pluralistic society. American Orthodoxy also still has the capacity to contemplate difficult issues relating to war and punishment, even
in today's age of global terror, free from the overriding issues of security that pervade daily Israeli life. A major strength of the halalchic tradition historically has been the contribution made to it by diverse communities situated in different cultural and social settings.
Is there, however, a concrete halalchic obligation to go beyond the
advocacy of Jewish interests for the sake of the Jewish community, and
to enter the public sphere solely in order to better society? This is a difficult issue. Indeed, the very need for modern orthodoxy to further theorize about this issue is itself a reflection of the preoccupation until now
with internal concerns. Some have argued that an halalchic obligation to
teach Jewish values and ideas may stem from Maimonides's view that
Jews are obligated to enforce Noahide law, although the issue is complex and disputed. 12 Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein has reasoned that such
an obligation may be inferred from the Talmud ( Shabbat 54b ), which
refers to the command of tokhaha, and poses responsibility to rebuke
family members and even fellow citizens, where the capacity to effect
change exists. 13 The most compelling argument, in my view, derives
from ethical obligations inherent in more general halalchic principles
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that underlie specific norms. The principle of" darkhei shalom," which
promotes peaceful relations between groups in society, should be
understood today not as an instrumental expression of Jewish self-interest-the need to fend off Gentile hatred-but, rather, as an ethical
imperative that is rooted in reciprocity, mutuality, and gratitude. 14 This
halakhic principle obligates us as individuals to work to better the society in which we have so flourished and to promote the peace of the city
in which we dwell and thrive.
Whether we also are obligated to contribute to society not solely as
individuals but as a community is another matter. In "Confrontation,"
R. Soloveitchik speaks of a universal responsibility deriving from the
charge to Adam and Eve and rooted in our identity as human beings. 15
This is a responsibility that devolves on each Jew as a citizen and need
not have a special Jewish dimension. Yet, the Rav also seems to address,
as Gerald Blidstein points out, the Jewish community as such, implying
that "the Jew must answer to the human imperative both as individual
and as community." 16 A communal obligation clearly must have a
Jewish dimension. This special Jewish dimension is discharged through
the process of hotsa)a. Thus, we are obligated to contribute to society,
not solely as individuals, but as a community as well, sharing sources of
wisdom and critical reflection with all others with whom we dwell.
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